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Among the most controversal appointments within the prerogative of
American Presidents have been special emissaries in foreign relations.
They are subject neither to Senate confirmation nor to authorization by
law. Despite several lengthy debates in the Senate and considerable
scholarly discussion on the constitutionality of these appointments,1
Presidents continue, as they have since George Washington, to appoint
such special emissaries as they wish, giving them such rank and title as
they deem appropriate. Elmer Plischke suggests several reasons why a
President employs special representatives in diplomatic activities:
Sometimes the Chief Executive needs to rely upon someone in whom he reposes special
personal confidence, who affords a more direct means of conducting United States
foreign relations, who possesses great personal stature, or who enjoys special qualifica-
tions for particular tasks and is uninhibited by restraining niceties of protocol or the
labyrinth of diplomatic bureaucracy. As long as Presidents are inclined to assume
personal direction over foreign relations, especially in times of crisis, doubtless they
will continue to appoint such individuals, who speak with the immediate authority of
the White House and who are able to cut through inhibiting traditions and the limita-
tions of ordinary diplomatic practice.2
Few of these appointments have proven more provocative and
intriguing than Albert B. Steinberger's as Special Agent in Samoa during
the Grant Administration. Although several scholars have chronicled
Steinberger's diplomatic activities, not even the most comprehensive
studies have provided an insight into the man himself. Little also has
been written on the reaction of the press in America to the events
associated with his extraordinary career.
Stephen W. Stathis is an analyst in American history with the Congressional Research
Service of the Library of Congress. He wishes to express his appreciation to his colleague
William R. Tansillfor his generous help and suggestions in the preparation of this article.
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Albert B. Steinberger. Reproduced from the New York Daily Graphic, August 4,
1875, p. 254 by the Library of Congress.

When San Francisco's Daily Alta California first revealed JStein-
berger's appointment in May 1873, he was depicted as "a man of bright,
keen intelligence, and [one who] possesses a bright eye that sees
everything." President Grant's decision to send Steinberger to the
Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands to feel their "pulse on the subject of
annexation to the United States" was viewed with considerable enthu-
siasm. His selection, the Alta assured its readers, would "give general
satisfaction" for he was "well suited to the work before him and will no
doubt create a favorable impression wherever he goes. His judgment
will ensure the production of a report that will be considered reliable and
worthy of careful attention."3
The following morning, the Alta's readers learned through an inter-
view with Steinberger that he had traveled as far west as Cheyenne,
Wyoming with President Grant and was actually on his way to the
Navigator (Samoan) Islands. Although he declined to reveal the purpose
of the visit, Steinberger did express astonishment that anything had
been learned of his mission since "he thought no one outside of the
Cabinet had any knowledge"4 of it.
The secrecy surrounding Steinberger's planned investigation was
understandable. Although the United States had appointed American
citizens as consuls in Samoa since 1852, and naval officers had explored
and surveyed the islands, an official treaty had never been negotiated
between the Samoan people and the United States. Now, many
Americans strongly believed, was the time for the United States to
become dominant along the South Pacific trade routes.
Despite considerable support among officials in the Grant Adminis-
tration, the native Samoans, and the maritime community, proposals
providing for an advantageous relationship with the Islands (a logical
location for a maritime way station, as well as a coaling depot for the
American Navy) had repeatedly been rebuffed by a reluctant Senate.
Meanwhile, England, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand had begun
their own schemes for controlling the Islands.5 It is in this setting that
Albert B. Steinberger appeared.
EARLY VENTURES
From his birth on Christmas Day 1840 until he was fifteen, Stein-
berger, the sixth of nine children of a country physician, lived with his
family in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. In 1856 his parents moved
for a time to Council Bluffs, Iowa, and then eventually settled in
Bellevue, Nebraska, near Omaha.6
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Just before he turned nineteen, Albert set out for Cherry Creek,
Colorado, where gold had recently been discovered. During the ensuing
two years, he gained momentary notoriety first as a politician and then as
Colorado's first playwright. Soon after arriving in Colorado, in November
1858, he became one of the two men selected to secure a charter from
the Territorial Legislature for the proposed townsite of St. Charles
which would soon become Denver.7
Denver's Apollo Hall was the scene a year later of his four-act
melodrama, "Skatara the Mountain Chieftain " which was written to
celebrate the newly created "Territory of Jefferson," a popular
government of short duration that preceded the legally constituted
Colorado Territory. "Skatara" received less than an enthusiastic res-
ponse from theater patrons, but subsequently became very popular
among the miners when it was rewritten as a burlesque.8
Early in the 1860s, Steinberger returned to the East, spending much
of his time for the next decade in New York when his business ventures
did not demand that he be elsewhere. In 1867 he married Caroline Lydia
Ely, a daughter of Alfred and Caroline Ely of Rochester, New York.
Caroline died in September 1871, after a lengthy illness following the
birth of their only child.9
His most intriguing sojourn prior to his "Mysterious Mission" to
Samoa took him to Paris for a personal interview with Napoleon III
which, supposedly, enabled him to negotiate a large contract for a
syndicate to provide the French with arms and ammunition during the
Franco-Prussian War. Before the contract was completed, financial
problems arose, and Steinberger became involved in a politically
motivated congressional investigation focusing on the Grant Administra-
tion's alleged violations of the neutrality laws. The inquiry itself never
really amounted to much, but his personal loss was considerable, and he
continued unsuccessfully to press his claims against the French until his
death.10
APPOINTMENT TO SAMOA
Steinberger's actual appointment by Secretary of State Hamilton Fish
on March 29, 1873, a s a n "intelligent special agent" responsible for
observing and reporting on the political and commercial conditions in the
Samoan Islands,11 culminated seven months of anxious waiting. Fish
first discussed the prospects of such a visit with President Grant on
August 17, 1872. Three days later, Fish was advised by Horace Porter,
the President's Secretary, that the prominent New York shipping
magnate William H. Webb strongly recommended Steinberger "as a
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competent person to visit the Navigator Islands" and "report upon their
conditions with a view of sending such information to Congress."12
It apparently was Webb's hope that Steinberger's findings would:
(1) help him finally obtain a congressional subsidy which would supple-
ment the one he had already obtained from New Zealand for the
operation of his steamer line between San Francisco and Australia, and
(2) prompt the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to recommend
approval of the agreement Commander Richard W. Meade, of the
United States Navy, had entered into with Chief Oau O Mauga of Pago
Pago early in 1872, whereby in exchange for American protection the
"latter granted the United States exclusive privilege of establishing
[in Pago Pago] harbor a naval station for the use and convenience of the
vessels of the United States government."13 President Grant's opinions
on these matters were already a matter of public record. In his annual
message in December of 1871 he had recommended that Congress
provide financial assistance for Webb's South Pacific venture.14 His
message of May 22, 1872, which accompanied Meade's agreement,
concluded by recommending with some modification its favorable
consideration by the Senate.15
Ironically, by the time Steinberger actually received his appointment
"Webb had given up the fight for a United States mail subsidy and, with
it, his Pacific shipping service, on which he had incurred substantial
losses."16 Despite Webb's detachment from the project, President Grant
remained deeply interested in obtaining suitable harbors in the Islands
for the United States Navy, and thus Steinberger's adventures began.
He embarked from San Francisco on June 29, 1873. En route he spent
several days in Honolulu, where the speculation in the San Francisco
newspapers regarding his mission had preceded him. To avoid future
misunderstanding, Steinberger soon after landing there met with his
Majesty King Lunalilo at his cottage at Waikiki to assure him that he was
"in no wise accredited to his government, and that the news-venders in
this, as in many other cases, were irresponsible agitators." In early
August Steinberger finally arrived in Samoa ready to begin one of the
most intriguing episodes in America's territorial expansion.17
According to the instructions forwarded to him by Secretary Fish, he
was to direct his attention specifically toward determining the number
of islands constituting the group, the number of native and foreign
inhabitants, the nature and quality of products grown and produced
there, and those harbors suitable for ocean-going vessels. Fish suggested
in his correspondence that it was "not unlikely that perhaps in the not
too distant future the interests of the United States may require not only
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a naval station in the Samoan group, but a harbor where [commercial
vessels] also may freely and securely frequent."
As a result "full and accurate information" would be necessary to
enable the Administration to determine what means would "be advisable
toward obtaining that objective." It was suggested that Steinberger, in
the course of his conversations with the various chiefs in the islands,
"caution them against making grants of their land to individual foreign-
ers." He was also cautioned "to avoid conversation, official or otherwise,
with any persons respecting relations between [the United States] and
any other country." In addition, Steinberger was reminded of the fact
that he was "not a regular diplomatic agent, formally accredited to
another government, but an informal one, of a special and confidential
character, appointed for the sole purpose of obtaining full and accurate
information."18
Conditions in Samoa when Steinberger "anchored in the harbor of
Pago Pago" on August 7, 1873, were highly conducive to his type of
diplomacy. Between April 1869 and August 1870 and again from
February 1872 to May 1873 Samoa had experienced a devastating civil
war "among the paramount chiefs vying for interisland supremacy."19
Just prior to Steinberger's arrival the Samoans had grown tired of
fighting among themselves. Steinberger's charming manners and endless
vigor, coupled with the fact that he represented a powerful government,
helped him almost immediately to captivate native and foreigner alike.
He became in a relatively short time the most sought-after voice in the
proceedings accompanying the drafting of the first Samoan Constitution
and Code of Laws. With Steinberger's influential assistance the Con-
stitution was promulgated on August 21, 1873.20
A little more than a month later, Steinberger sailed from Apia having
completed his initial mission to the Islands. Before he left, however, he
told his newfound friends they were "brave, earnest, and honest people,"
a people who believed in America and hoped for guidance from it.
Although Steinberger conceded he could promise them nothing from
the United States, he would express their high hopes to his government.21
In the subsequent report of his experiences prepared for Secretary
Fish, Steinberger claimed that Samoans felt for the first time that "they
had met a white man other than the missionaries who advised them
against the sale of their land and mingled freely with them without
sinister motives."22 While such an appraisal appears self-serving,
Steinberger's own opinion of his accomplishments during August and
September 1873 was not an isolated one.
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Reverend S. J. Witmer and Reverend George A. Turner, chairman
and secretary, respectively, of the Samoan District of the London
Missionary Society, in reflecting upon Steinberger's achievements, told
him that they would be "most happy" to see him return as the "first
United States representative . . . feeling sure, from what we have seen
of you, that you will do justice to the Samoan people, and aid them in
every possible way, in all their laudable efforts for social and political
improvement." Turner, in another personal letter to the departing
visitor from the United States, wrote that his "honest, kindly spirit"
had won him "esteem and love, and you leave with the hearty good
wishes of the entire native population."23 A member of the Wesleyan
Missionary Society, Reverend George Brown, in somewhat different
language, praised Steinberger for his steadfast devotion to learning
everything possible about Samoa and its people. Father L. Elloy, the
Roman Catholic Bishop in Samoa, congratulated him for the wisdom he
had shown in fulfilling his delicate and important mission.24
Native Samoan leaders, too, were lavish in their appreciation of
Steinberger. On October 3, 1873, the Ta'imua, the council of seven
paramount chiefs which headed the newly organized government, and
the Pule, a group of high "orators" who, among other functions, were
to "see that the laws were executed," drafted a letter to President Grant
endorsing Steinberger's objective, which they perceived as a plan to bring
about a union between the government of Samoa and America. To
facilitate this process it was their expressed desire to have Steinberger
return to Samoa because the "peacefulness and the amiability of this
gentleman [were] truly marvelous."25
Steinberger returned to San Francisco the following December. A
month and a half later he sent Secretary Fish a lengthy report of his
findings, and twenty-seven relevant documents. Growing impatient
after some three weeks of silence, Steinberger finally wrote Fish on
March 4, 1874, "hoping for an expression of the sense of the [State]
Department and the Government" regarding his efforts in Samoa. "I am
earnest in my desire," he wrote, "to serve the Samoan people, and feel
a sense of obligation to them, forseeing also the great advantage to our
Government." That same day, Fish informed him by letter that his
report had "been read with lively interest. It is replete with novel and
valuable information, and shows that you must have been a diligent and
judicious observer."26 Fish's correspondence contained no suggestion
whatsoever regarding how or if the information Steinberger had gleaned
would be a guide to future government policy.
A few days after Steinberger's report was forwarded to the Senate by
President Grant on April 21, the New York Daily Tribune deemed it
important enough to warrant reprinting.27 "The charms of the tropical
scenery, perennial fruits, and a confiding, half clad, dusky population,"
the Tribune suggested in an editorial a few days later, "have long
exercised a singular fascination over the official mind, and what may be
called the banana principle in politics has become a recognized influence
in our political affairs." This policy has prompted "some of the most
charming idyls in the literature of Public Documents." Steinberger,
however, found in these "Fortunate Isles, just under the equator, more
beautiful things than any other Special Agent ever had before, even in
the balmy paradise of the West Indies, or in the spice-scented shores of
Russian America [Alaska]."
More importantly, argued the Tribune, these islands are "in the direct
track of commerce between San Francisco, Honolulu, and the South
American ports on the one side, and New Zealand and Southern
Polynesia; and as a station for coaling and supplies it would seem to be
exactly what we require." Despite all this it is "by no means certain that
we should gain by the establishment of a protectorate enough advantage
to pay us for the trouble, jobbery, and political complications inevitably
involved." In the American "system of government there is no place for
protectorates or colonies."28 Others, including Congress, were of a
similar mind, and Steinberger's report was soon forgotten.29
REAPPOINTMENT
Despite the lack of any encouragement from Washington, Steinberger
continued to bombard Secretary Fish with proposals which would allow
him to return once again to Samoa.30 He also "approached the Navy
Service chief, Admiral David P . Porter, who indicated that he would
speak with [President] Grant about what might be done." Another
useful ally was Orville Babcock, the President's secretary.31 Finally, on
August 17, 1874, President Grant informed Fish by letter that he wanted
Steinberger to return to Samoa and be commissioned "with such powers
as may be consistent with law and the best interests of the country."
Steinberger, the Secretary of State was told, contemplated a "short visit
to Europe, the object of which he would explain" as soon as he could
meet with him.32
On November 19 Steinberger, by letter from Baltimore, once again
emphasized his dedication to the interests of the Samoan people and
assured the Secretary of State of their "devotion to make Samoa
valuable, creditable and popular." Under his direction, he promised the
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"great resources of the islands [would] be quickly developed." He had
already "conferred with Messrs. Godeffroy [the owners of the largest
commercial interests in the South Pacific]," at Hamburg, "and received
their assurance they would help secure German recognition of the
Samoan Government immediately upon his arrival there." It would be
advantageous if he had "such diplomatic powers as would give him
precedence over the American and other consuls." He further suggested
a "few presents such as two small guns, (brass), a Gatling gun, a
12-pounder Parrott, to give dignity to their government house; also a
small lot of light clothing and small arms for guards, and such stationery
as the Department (if in accordance with law) could furnish."33
Steinberger's persuasive powers were not to be denied. On December
I I , 1874, he was authorized to return to Samoa as a "special agent of the
United States." He also learned that Secretary Fish, after reading his
report and reviewing information received from other sources, had
become convinced of the natural fertility, important resources, and
strategic importance of Samoa. Fish, however, questioned "whether
these considerations would be sufficient to satisfy our people that
annexation of [the] islands to the United States is essential to our safety
and prosperity." Amidst this uncertainty, Steinberger's activities were
to "be limited to observing and reporting upon Samoan affairs, and to
impressing those in authority there with the lively interest which" the
United States had in their happiness and welfare. Steinberger also was
to carry with him a letter from President Grant to the Samoan leaders
together with a number of gifts including several guns, ammunition,
100 sailor uniforms, 3 United States flags and extra bunting, and some
band instruments.34
Although Steinberger was to serve without pay as he had in 1873,
there are clear indications that other personal considerations made the
prospects of a second visit to Samoa potentially a financial bonanza. His
earlier discussions with the Hamburg firm of John Cesar Godeffroy &
Son were considerably more self-serving than he had led Secretary Fish
to believe in his correspondence of November 19. Evidence has not
been discovered even remotely suggesting Fish knew Steinberger had,
on September 16, 1874, more than two months prior to his appointment
as a Special Agent, negotiated a secret contract with the German firm.
According to that agreement Steinberger was to promote the interests
of Godeffroy & Son by helping to establish a stable government in the
Islands and then by working to ensure that the German firm obtained
a virtual monopoly over trade and finances there. For his efforts Stein-
berger would receive a 10% commission for all materials which the
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Samoan government purchased from the firm, and a 10% commission
for all products sold to it by the Samoans.35
In addition, Steinberger on January 18, 1875, some three weeks prior
to his departure from San Francisco, entered into an agreement with
John H. B. Latrobe, Jr., of Baltimore wherein the latter agreed to
accompany Steinberger to Samoa and provide assistance in carrying out
whatever he might negotiate there. Latrobe also agreed to assist Stein-
berger in establishing and organizing a government in the islands that
would prove beneficial to both parties. Once Latrobe had reimbursed
Steinberger the thirteen thousand five hundred dollars which the latter
had incurred as debt in connection with their business arrangement,
Latrobe would be entitled to twenty-five percent of all commissions and
pecuniary profits of every description from all undertakings in which
Steinberger might engage.
Latrobe also was to receive suitable quarters and subsistence; trans-
portation for himself and his personal effects from San Francisco to
Samoa; and twenty-five percent of any compensation he might receive
from the United States Government for past or future employment in
connection with Samoa." Besides financial considerations, Steinberger
also agreed to "use his influence, both official and personal to procure
for . . . Latrobe the best and most honorable and lucrative office" in
whatever government he might establish after first providing for
himself.36
Both the Godeffroy agreement and the subsequent contract negotiated
with Latrobe suggest by their existence that Steinberger's motives at
the very least were highly suspect at this point in time. These are clear
indications that Steinberger embarked on his second adventure in
Samoa determined to make every effort possible to establish himself in
a favorable economic and political status as soon after he arrived as
possible. Once he gained such a position, he was apparently convinced
he could hold it for as long as he desired.
Upon his return to Samoa on April 1, 1875, after sixteen months in
the United States, Steinberger found political conditions radically
changed. During his absence the government he had helped establish
had proven not to be as satisfactory to the natives as one with
a king at its head. Unable to choose a single king, the chiefs of the
various Samoan districts decided to elect two kings, Malietoa Laupepa
and Pulepule, who were members of rival families. On January 2,
1875, the two kings were jointly vested with that office and title. Almost
immediately thereafter Samoa once again drifted toward another civil
war.37
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Steinberger's arrival amidst these conditions was greeted with jubilant
delight by the natives, and an elaborate festival and "fono" [assembly]
were held in his honor. During the next several weeks Steinberger
traveled aboard his private schooner, the Peerless, to the various islands
where he met with several chiefs regarding a new constitution. Through-
out all of the preliminary discussions preceding the formal adoption of a
new Constitution on May 18, Steinberger repeatedly declared his
intention of remaining in Samoa. Undoubtedly such expressions strongly
influenced Samoan reunification. Adding to the stature of Steinberger's
activities were the actions of Captain Henry Erben, Commander of the
U.S.S. Tuscarora, who, after depositing Steinberger at Apia, remained
in the harbor in a supportive posture while at the same time undertaking
general judicious inquiries. Erben's actions "added to the local impres-
sion that Washington had adopted a more far-reaching policy of
intervention than that in force in Samoa prior to Steinberger's return."38
The constitution proposed by Steinberger and subsequently adopted
provided for a legislative branch having two houses, the Taimua and the
Faipule; a king to be chosen every four years alternately from the "two
great houses of Malietoa and Tupua;" and a premier who would act as
a counselor to the king. Together the two houses of the "parliament"
were authorized to levy and collect taxes, to pay debts, to provide for the
common defense and general welfare, to borrow and coin money, to
regulate foreign commerce, and to build post offices and roads. The king
was sovereign of the people and the chiefs; responsible for the direction
of the army and the implements of war, of public lands and the poll and
land taxes; chief judge of the supreme court; and executer of laws and
treaties. His most important appointment, the "Premier of the Kingdom,"
was to "transact for the king all business connected with the special
interests of the kingdom; and all documents and business executed by
the premier" were to have the same "force as though executed by the
King's authority." The King could not act in any official capacity
without the knowledge of the premier. The premier also could participate
in floor debates in both Houses, and was the presiding officer of the
upper chamber.39
PREMIER OF THE KINGDOM
Malietoa Laupepa, the first King chosen under the new constitution,
soon after his selection offered the premiership to Steinberger, who at
the time was still an American citizen and a special agent of the United
States government. On July 4, 1875, Steinberger informed Secretary of
State Fish that he had "accepted the position of premier of the kingdom,
95
but publicly announced that, as an American citizen, [he] could receive
no pay, emoluments, or title of nobility." He also asked for the assistance
of the State Department "in the passage of a bill by Congress permitting
[him], as an 'American citizen,' to hold office . . . under a foreign
government." In his concluding remarks, Steinberger wrote: "So much
does America fill the hearts and minds of these people that any treaty
for harbors, naval stations, coaling-depots, or other privileges [drafted]
in Washington would receive prompt recognition here."40 Although
Steinberger's letter was received on August 30, neither a response nor
a request for his resignation as a special agent followed. Subsequently,
on October 28, he officially forwarded Fish his resignation.41
At least one author has argued that Fish took no official action against
Steinberger following his selection as Premier because he was waiting
for Steinberger's response to charges that during his first mission to
Samoa he had assumed and exercised unauthorized power inconsistent
with his instructions from the State Department.42 Such an interpreta-
tion is not substantiated by fact. For more than a month prior to the
receipt of Steinberger's letter announcing his selection as Premier,
several major American and Hawaiian newspapers had published stories
of his appointment. It is inconceivable to think that these articles were
not discussed at the State Department. A more plausible explanation is
that Steinberger's new title was a source of extreme embarrassment to
the Department. It was thought by most journalists that he had already
resigned,43 and several major newspapers had enthusiastically exposed
the story as yet another Grant administration bungle.
The World of New York City, for example, envisioned "one of the
first duties of the Democratic House of Representatives" after it
convened in December would be "to ascertain the extent to which the
funds and the property of the United States have been lawlessly lavished
upon [the] scandalous and shameless speculation" in Samoa.44
San Francisco's Daily Examiner suggested in an editorial entitled:
"Grant Establishing Slavery," that there was "immense speculation"
that it was the object of Steinberger and Captain Erben to compel the
Samoans to raise sugar and cotton, working them "just as a California
miner does a rich 'lead,' or as the Southern planters formerly worked
their Negroes."45 Others such as the New York Times and Frank Leslie's
Illustrated Newspaper viewed events in Samoa as yet another misuse of
"Manifest Destiny," while the New York Sun considered the Stein-
berger incident a creation of the "active brain of [President Grant] the
potentate of Long Branch as a counter check to British rule in the island
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cluster of Oceania."46 Whether Steinberger cared or even knew about
the controversy his appointment as Premier generated is not known.
Meanwhile, in Samoa Steinberger during his first few months as
Premier was "self-denying, earnest, and enthusiastic in his efforts to
ameliorate the conditions of the people, and to raise their government
and country to the dignity and independence of a well-ordered and
independent nation."47 He was also able to secure the support and
cooperation of the missionaries in several of his endeavors. His manner
proved to be quite different from that anticipated by most American
journalists and suggested in the contracts he negotiated just prior to his
departure for Samoa. Unfortunately, it probably will never be known
whether Steinberger's posture was contrived or real.
DEMISE
Little time elapsed before Steinberger's policies began to arouse the
enmity of those whites in Samoa who felt he had gone too far in his
desire to protect the rights of the natives. Many English and German
residents were apprehensive regarding Steinberger's threat to investigate
land claims, and concerned that he might through subtle conversation
divert Samoan trade toward the United States. Moreover, Great Britain's
motives were at least in part the result of the annexation notions of New
Zealand and Australia. A willing supporter of the English and German
charges, United States Consul to Samoa S. S. Foster had himself long
sought to have Steinberger removed. Jealousy of "Steinberger's influence
as well as his threat to block foreign land schemes with which Foster
was allied, probably caused the friction between" the two men. Foster,
even before Steinberger's arrival in April, complained to the State
Department of a tendency on the latter's part to assume unwarranted
powers.48
Not until December 17, however, did Foster take matters into his own
hands. On that day, a few minutes after 8 a.m., Foster boarded Stein-
berger's yacht, the Peerless, which was anchored in Apia harbor, and
"seized her in the name of the United States. . . . At the time of the
seizure the crew consisted of two hands and a cook." Steinberger was
not on board, having left the vessel a few moments earlier. Subsequently,
Foster, with the assistance of several men from the British man-of-war
Barracouta commanded by Captain Charles E. Stevens, removed a
portion of military equipment and arms stored aboard. At the same time
Foster took possession of Steinberger's personal belongings including
some of his correspondence. The seizure culminated several consulta-
tions between Foster, Captain Stevens, who had arrived in Apia on
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December 12, S. F. Williams, the British acting consul, and Dr. George
A. Turner of the London Missionary Society.49
Four days after the seizure, Steinberger forwarded a formal protest to
Foster for his "illegal, unnatural, and wanton despoiling and dismantling"
of the Peerless. Similar complaints which had been sent to Captain
Stevens some hours earlier were attached. The same day that Steinberger
rebuked Foster, King Malietoa wrote to the United States Consul
demanding the immediate return of the "arms and ammunition seized
and taken from the yacht Peerless."50 These protests were followed by
three meetings on December 24, 27, and 29 between Captain Stevens
and King Malietoa, and several others including Foster, Williams, and
Steinberger. For the most part these proceedings centered on the
authenticity of Steinberger's credentials as a representative of the United
States, and the motives prompting his residence in Samoa.
Discussion during the first meeting focused on Steinberger's alleged
inability to exhibit credentials from the United States government
granting him the degree of authority he had been exercising. During the
second session a long, heated exchange between Steinberger and Stevens
concluded only after the two antagonists were finally interrupted by King
Malietoa's declaration that if Steinberger had "done anything wrong or
had violated his oath, it was the business of [the Samoan] government.
. . . [We are] responsible for his acts, and [we] do not consider that he
had violated his duty." More important, the Samoans did not want
foreign representatives interfering in their governmental matters.51
The final session of December 29, centered on a speech prepared by
King Malietoa the English translation of which was read aloud for the
first time on this occasion. Malietoa in this statement explained that he
considered Steinberger "neither an adventurer nor a schemer, but . . . a
gentleman whom we requested the President of the United States to
send to us, in our petition to him, to assist us in establishing our
government." It was in accordance with that petition that Steinberger
was allowed to return to Samoa:
We were aware of everything that transpired in reference to Colonel Steinberger before
we appointed him premier of our government. We did not wish him to have a com-
mission from the United States of America to establish our government; he has taken
the oath of allegiance to our government, and we will protect him. We would now this
day demand of your excellency what is the meaning of this examination of our premier ?
Who is it that doubts he is our premier; which of the consuls is it that does not know
he has been appointed by us ?52
Stevens in response warned that if the Samoans continued to support
Steinberger, their laws and taxes would cease to be applicable to British
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subjects. Immediately thereafter, the King, the Taimua, and the Faipule
following a brief consultation "agreed to stand by and support Stein-
berger at all hazards."53
During the next two weeks the continuing controversy between the
Samoan government and the British and American consuls aroused
virtually everyone's interest and comments.54 Samoan support of
Steinberger, however, remained virtually unchanged. Then, on January
13, 1876, Stevens and his associates (which by this time also included
Alfred L. Poppe, acting German consul and an agent of J. C. Godeffroy
& Son), issued a proclamation declaring foreign inhabitants would be
withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Samoan government. King
Malietoa's stinging protest of the following week fell on deaf ears.55
Meanwhile Stevens, together with the British and American consuls, was
busy scheming Steinberger's removal. On the evening of February 7,
King Malietoa, while on board the Barracouta, was pressured into
signing a letter stating that Steinberger was the cause of the confrontation
between the Samoan government and the foreign officials, and his
immediate removal was imperative. The following morning Malietoa
announced to the Taimua and Faipule that he was removing Steinberger
as premier. Steinberger's departure, Malietoa assured his fellow Samoans,
would not alter their interest in securing bona fide protection from the
United States. Until the United States expressed an interest in such an
arrangement, he would rely on the British government for protection.
Following the King's remarks, Steinberger was placed under arrest by
Stevens and jailed aboard the Barracouta.56
That same evening an outraged Taimua and Faipule forced King
Malietoa to resign and removed him under guard to another island.
Subsequent efforts by Captain Stevens and the American and British
consuls to reinstate Malietoa finally erupted on March 13 into open
fighting between the sailors of the Barracouta and native Samoans.
During this skirmish four sailors and three Samoans met their deajh
before the natives finally surrendered.
A few days later the Barracouta sailed from Apia for Auckland, New
Zealand carrying as prisoners Steinberger and Jonas M. Cole, a former
consul at Samoa, who, after the former's arrest, was accused of being the
principal influence in thwarting the efforts to reinstate King Malietoa.57
John H. B. Latrobe, who, through Steinberger's efforts had been able
to secure the titles of secretary of war, chief justice, treasurer and private
secretary, and commander-in-chief of the Samoan army and navy, was
put on another ship and sent home to Baltimore.58
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The following week Steinberger and Cole were released at Levuka,
Fiji after Sir Arthur Gordon, the British governor there, informed
Captain Stevens that his actions in Samoa had been most improper.
Steinberger immediately embarked for Auckland after having learned
court-martial proceedings against Stevens were to be held in that city.
When he arrived there, however, he found that the entire matter would
be referred to the home office.59 Although Great Britain never did assume
responsibility for Captain Stevens' actions since he had allegedly acted
at the request of the United States consul and the King of Samoa,60
Steinberger received a vindication of sorts when Captain Stevens was
compelled to resign his commission, and consuls Foster and Williams
were removed from office by their respective governments.61
In the late spring and early summer of 1876, after news of events in
Samoa finally reached other islands in the South Pacific and beyond,
there was considerable public discussion of what it all meant. Papers in
New Zealand were generally quite critical of Captain Stevens' actions,
while the Australians and British were far less sympathetic toward
Steinberger.62 In the United States, the New York Times and the New
York World assumed the lead in denouncing President Grant's special
agent. The World of March 12, 1876, characterized Steinberger as
"Grant's disreputable friend and protege." An "adventurer" who
abused the "American flag in the most open and insolent manner," he
was a person whose actions should be the subject of a House of Repre-
sentatives inquiry. "It is bad enough to have to bear the burden of
Belknapism in our home affairs, but this Pacific job threatens to emit a
stench which cannot be stifled within our own borders." The sooner
this matter is resolved, "the better it will be for the country."63 Again
on April 20, the World in a lengthy editorial entitled "Steinberger's
Downfall" called for a congressional inquiry of the whole affair.64
Suggesting provocative side issues to a possible congressional inquiry,
the World in late April and early May repeated the widespread rumor of
a corrupt arrangement between Steinberger and the President's con-
fidential secretary Orville Babcock, who only a few months earlier had
barely escaped conviction for alleged involvement in the whiskey rings.
At approximately the same time, the World also published a story from
the San Francisco Chronicle which traced Steinberger's downfall to love
of a Samoan Princess, Safua.65 Using an entirely different tactic, the
New York Times on May 5 argued: "there never was . . . any good
reason why Steinberger should have been sent to the Samoan Islands,
or have been permitted the quasi sanction of the government in his
ridiculous intrigues in the South Pacific." His failure had jeopardized
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the "prestige of the Republic . . . in the South Pacific."60 "Steinberger's
career," Nation magazine remarked on April 27, "appears to have been
that of what is popularly known as a 'fraud.' There was no reason for
sending him to" Samoa. His activities there were a "pure farce, and the
wonder is how Steinberger got anybody to play it with him."67
Criticism of the Steinberger affair, however, was not all one-sided.
The March 12 New York Sun in even stronger language suggested that
President "Grant should at once . . . recall the United States Consul,
and declare war against the powers whose consuls joined with him in
discrediting Steinberger's edicts." "By what right," asked the New York
Herald two weeks later, "did the Captain of a British ship take possession
of Steinberger's navy? . . . Certainly America can protect her own
dignity." Although the Herald did not believe that Steinberger's enter-
prise in Samoa was legitimately American, he was entitled to American
protection; "it is not pleasant to see the British officers hauling down
American flags and kicking American citizens as though they were
Hottentots or kings of Delhi. The President should look into the
business and see what it means."68
Using similar language, San Francisco's Daily Alta California of May
7 questioned Stevens' right to "interfere with the Government of Samoa;
to make or unmake Kings; to land a couple of hundred of his men; to
attempt to disarm the people, and to murder them if they refused?"
Such actions, the Alta declared, were more than adequate grounds for a
congressional inquiry. Emphasizing the economic implications of the
Barracouta incident, the Alta on April 24 asked, "Why is it that the
people do not awake to the fact" that if we let the British take Samoa we
are losing a "trade that can be diverted to [San Francisco], instead of
being carried on directly with Europe—a trade that is valuable to us,
to say nothing of the great" opportunity these Islands would provide for
a coaling-station in the South Pacific.69
Meanwhile, as the Steinberger controversy continued to be badgered
about by the press, the State Department was the recipient of several
conflicting reports from Foster, Steinberger, and others which further
confused the issues at hand. Assistant Secretary of State William Hunter
learned from a letter Foster mailed on March 18, 1876, that the latter
had found several important documents among Steinberger's possessions
following his arrest. Included among these papers was a contract between
the Godeffroy firm and Steinberger which fully explained "his course
[of action in Samoa] against the foreigners, and particularly his enve-
nomed course towards the American consul and American citizens."70
A month and a half later, Steinberger informed Secretary Fish that his
1 0 1
agreement with John Cesar Godeffroy had been: (i) drafted specifically
for the benefit of the Samoan people whose government the Hamburg
firm pledged to induce the German imperial government to recognize,
(2) consummated prior to his becoming an official of either the United
States or Samoan governments, and (3) "abrogated by mutual agreement
between Mr. Alfred S. Poppe at Samoa for J. C. Godeffroy & Sons, and
[Steinberger] a few days after [his] arrival, and such notification was
given to the house in Hamburg."71
The sincerity of Steinberger's efforts, the Samoan Taimua and Faipule
assured President Grant in a May 1,1876, letter, could not be questioned.
Those responsible for his downfall had acted against the will of the
Samoan people. "Therefore," the Samoan legislature announced "we
declare now to Your Excellency that we wish still to have Colonel
Steinberger as our premier, because he has done right with a true love
and great patience." If it was the President's intention not to allow
Steinberger to return, "we then humbly pray to Your Excellency to
appoint another gentleman as good and as skillful as Colonel Steinberger
to teach our government."72
Steinberger was destined never to return to Samoa. In the years
immediately following his adventures in Samoa, he unsuccessfully
sought remuneration from the British government for the damages
inflicted by Captain Stevens.73 Thereafter he quickly disappeared from
the American scene. At the height of his momentary notoriety in 1876
the New York World quipped that Steinberger was "destined always to
remain a tremendous historical figure." While it was true that he does
not stir the public consciousness "in the same dignified degree that
George WASHINGTON does, and FRANKLIN somewhat exceeds him in
mild majesty of style . . . he could readily clean out all the signers of
the Declaration of Independence at draw-poker."74
When Steinberger died in 1894, however, little was remembered of
his exploits except that he had been "once chosen King of the Samoan
Islands " and for his efforts was "called by all kinds of names."75 Vague
references were made to Steinberger's interest "in several well-known
projects among them being the Cape Cod Canal," and to his having
lived in New York since his Samoan adventure.76 Even the fact that he
had served as a paymaster for the United States Army was not known.77
Only the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Patriot was able to tell its readers
that Steinberger had been an "erect, handsome gentleman, under




Much of his life remains shrouded in mystery. Extensive research
among the various collections of the Library of Congress, the National
Archives, and the major historical and genealogical societies in New
York, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, and Colorado has revealed little of Albert
B. Steinberger beyond the information contained in the several hundred
pages of congressional documents relating to his activities in Samoa.
Although several writers have suggested Steinberger's appointment as
a special agent stemmed from a close relationship with Grant and
shipping magnate William A. Webb,79 documentation which would
conclusively substantiate this claim has not been found. There is also no
proof, as some have argued, that Steinberger was appointed because he
held a $750 gambling note signed by President Grant.80 How or why he
obtained the title Colonel, a designation he carried for at least the last
thirty years of his life, life, likewise remains a conundrum.81
Perplexing questions are likely to remain unanswered. It is clear that
Steinberger as an executive agent of the United States assumed authority
not granted to him by the State Department when he helped establish
and subsequently became a prominent official in a new foreign govern-
ment. We also know that this same man, a year after his forced departure,
was still held "in a degree of esteem amounting to veneration, and [was]
looked upon by [the Samoans] as the wisest and safest ruler and best
friend" Samoa had ever had.82 Essentially, Steinberger's activities in
Samoa were positive though not authorized.
Although there are several plausible explanations for his course of
action, the issue of overriding importance is that Steinberger was a
special agent of the President. Throughout our nation's history it has
not been uncommon for a President to rely upon a special agent to act
as his alter ego in a particular phase of foreign policy. Could such have
been the case in Samoa?
Congress in 1876 and again in 1877, despite a public outcry for a
congressional inquiry into Steinberger's activities, published without a
word of debate or comment several hundred pages of documents relating
to the matter which it had received from the Executive Branch.83 In
1888 the Senate published as part of a minority report of the Committee
on Foreign Relations a list of 438 diplomatic agents who had been sent
to "negotiate and conclude conventions, agreements, and treaties with
foreign powers since 1792," who were appointed without the advice and
consent of the Senate. The report also revealed that between 1827 and
1880 not one President had asked for Senate approval of such appoint-
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ments. Missing from the Committee's statistics were many other special
agents such as Albert B. Steinberger, whose missions purportedly were
essentially fact-finding in nature. Their inclusion would have added
several hundred more names to a special category of presidential appoint-
ments which have included such illustrious personages as John Quincy
Adams, James Monroe, Henry Clay, Martin Van Buren, Daniel Webster,
James Buchanan, George Bancroft, Hamilton Fish, Colonel (Edward
Mandell) House, Bernard M. Baruch, Wendell Willkie, and Harry
Hopkins.84
"At the beginning of American history," Hans Morgenthau suggests,
"the use of the special agent was primarily due to the scarcity of available
talent. Later it was due to the low quality of many diplomatic representa-
tives, chosen for political reasons and without regard for their diplomatic
qualifications. More recently," in Morgenthau's opinion, "the President
has availed himself of the special agent in order to make sure that his
will prevails in the conduct of American foreign policy. The institution
of the special agent is indeed inseparable from the preeminent, contested
and uncertain role the President plays in the determination of American
foreign policy."85
Special agent Albert B. Steinberger was the product of this policy.
Had his premiership gone smoothly and had Samoa become an American
protectorate within a reasonable length of time, it is conceivable the
Islands would have been spared a quarter century of revolution and war,
and the American, British, and German governments would have
avoided confrontations that, at times, nearly resulted in war.
Certainly it is unreasonable to suggest that President Grant could have
predicted such a course. Nevertheless, Grant was an expansionist who
was chastened after the Santo Domingo debacle and who looked upon
Steinberger's activities as a trial balloon. If Steinberger's mission had
succeeded, it could have provided naval and coaling facilities to comple-
ment those which later existed at Pearl Harbor. Instead, the results of
his experiment constitute a part of our esoteric history, familiar only to
the specialist in America's Pacific adventures.
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